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REAL-NAME REGISTRATION RULES AND THE FADING
DIGITAL ANONYMITY IN CHINA

Jyh-An Lee† & Ching-Yi Liu†
Abstract:
China has implemented comprehensive online real-name
registration rules, which require Internet users to disclose their identities. Chinese
national law has required most online service providers to implement real-name
registration since 2012. This article uses the real-name registration rules to illustrate the
supremacy and limitations of the Network Authoritarian Model (NAM), an approach
leveraging corporate resources for political surveillance and occasionally adopted by the
Chinese party-state. By addressing the evolution of real-name registration rules in China,
this article illustrates the party-state’s gradual efforts in both eliminating cyberspace
anonymity and etching Chinese characteristics on the architecture of the Internet.
Although the Chinese government has faced serious challenges in enforcing the realname registration policy and current enforcement is far from satisfactory, China is not
alone in promoting such a policy. Major Internet companies, including Google,
Facebook, and LinkedIn, have expressed similar interests in requiring users to register
their real names. Moreover, policymakers in developed and developing countries are
exploring similarly themed regulations and China, therefore, may well be in the vanguard
of the global movement for online real-name registration. Nonetheless, requiring realname registration in China has not only created huge costs for Internet companies, but
also given rise to fierce controversy associated with free speech, privacy, and law
enforcement. In this article, we identify several important legal and policy implications
of the Chinese real-name registration policy. We also illustrate the foremost predicament
currently faced by the Chinese party-state in enforcing the policy. This analysis argues
that China may create a “spillover effect” in jurisdictions outside China as well as in the
global Internet architecture.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Online real-name registration policies require the disclosure of the
speaker’s identity with the aid of various methods, ranging from government
regulation of Internet service providers (ISPs) to technologies embedded in
communication infrastructure.
Promulgated under the Chinese
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government’s philosophy of fostering a “responsible” Internet, the real-name
registration rules have become one of the regulatory risks of doing business
in China. For example, in its annual report filed with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, Sina, a NASDAQ-listed company and one of
China’s largest Internet companies, warned its investors that Chinese
authorities might shut it down because its Twitter-like microblogging sites
were in noncompliance with the Chinese government’s real-name
registration rules. 1 In order to maintain public order, China has enacted
local and national laws requiring Internet users, especially bloggers and
microbloggers, 2 to register their real name and personal information with
various ISPs that directly provide users with Internet access or services. 3
These regulations reflect the Chinese government’s position that individuals
should be responsible for their online communications. Nonetheless, this
regulation has simultaneously led to fierce controversy and policy debate.4
As the Internet facilitates economic development, Chinese policy
makers aim to channel its energy and creativity in ways that fit the Chinese
governance model. But what the Chinese party-state government is
concerned about is the free flow of information which, enabled by digital
technologies, may upset social stability. Therefore, the government has
carved out a unique approach to coping with this instance of the “dictator’s
dilemma.” 5 In order to control online information, the government has
imposed strict duties on Internet companies or ISPs under the twin principles
of “harmonious society” and “social responsibility.” 6 Most Internet
1

Loretta Chao, Microblogs Survive Real-Name Rules—So Far, WALL ST. J.: CHINA REALTIME (Apr.
30,
2012),
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/04/30/microblogs-survive-real-name-rules-sofar/?mod=google_news_blog.
2
See, e.g., Li Shigong, Is Real-Name Registration Necessary for Micro-Blogs?, BEIJING REV. (Feb.
2, 2012), http://www.bjreview.com.cn/forum/txt/2012-01/30/content_422194.htm.
3
See infra Part III. A.; see also Kristen Farrell, The Big Mamas Are Watching: China’s Censorship
of the Internet and the Strain on Freedom of Expression, 15 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 577, 584–88 (2007)
(analyzing China’s requirement that Internet users register their personal information).
4
See, e.g., Fan Dong, Controlling the Internet in China: The Real Story, 18 CONVERGENCE: INT’L J.
RES. INTO MEDIA TECH. 403, 409 (2012) (indicating that the real-name registration system “has been
vehemently opposed by scholars, netizens and industry people” in China); Hai Tang, Blogging in China:
Freedom of Expression vs Political Censorship in Sexual and Satirical Blogs, 2 NETWORKING
KNOWLEDGE: J. MECCSA POSTGRADUATE NETWORK 1, 4 (2009) (pointing out that the real-name
registration policy “seems to be unacceptable and unpleasant to Chinese bloggers”).
5
See, e.g., Johan Lagerkvist, Principal-Agent Dilemma in China’s Social Media Sector? The
Party-State and Industry Real-Name Registration Waltz, 6 INT’L J. COMM. 2628, 2629 (2012) [hereinafter
Lagerkvist, Principal-Agent Dilemma].
6
See, e.g., Johan Lagerkvist, New Media Entrepreneurs in China: Allies of the Party-State or Civil
Society?, 65 J. INT’L AFF. 169, 173 (2011) [hereinafter Lagerkvist, New Media Entrepreneurs in China].
See also Ann Bartow, Privacy Laws and Privacy Levers: Online Surveillance Versus Economic
Development in the People’s Republic of China, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 853, 853 (2013) (addressing the Chinese
government’s effort to reconcile the two competing interests of maintaining effective government
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companies have tamely abided by the government’s mandates and have
cooperated with the government in enforcing Internet regulations. In this
way, the companies hope to continue extracting profit from the largest
digital economy in the world. Put differently, by taking advantage of the
business sector’s profit-driven motives, the authoritarian government can
easily leverage commercial power and corporate resources for online
political censorship and surveillance. This so-called “Network Authoritarian
Model” (NAM) has strong Chinese characteristics.7 In the past decade, the
Chinese government has successfully implemented the NAM via various
measures, such as Internet filtering and strict Internet regulations.8 China’s
implementation of the real-name registration rules can also be understood as
an example of the network-authoritarian regulatory model.
However, China’s implementation of the NAM is not without its
challenges. Because the strategy relies on compliance by private ISPs, it
may be vulnerable when those private ISPs lack incentive or the ability to
cooperate.
As China’s real-name registration rules have created
insurmountable compliance costs, most Internet companies have hesitated to
fully implement the real-name registration rules and the accompanying
verification system. 9 Such noncompliance has led to more uncertainties
associated with the effective enforcement of the real-name registration
policy. Despite the success of the network authoritarian approach in
controlling the flow of online information in the last decade, the
uncertainties have created challenges for the continuance of this approach.10
The implementation of the Chinese real-name registration policy
presents an ideal opportunity to analyze the interaction between the
various—sometimes competing—agendas associated with privacy, online
free speech, and government control of the Internet.11 China is definitely not
surveillance and developing the nation’s knowledge economy); Id. at 869 (arguing that prevention of social
unrest is one of the Chinese government’s main goals in controlling online communications); Id. at 894
(“Much of the active governmental surveillance in China is directed at promulgating the CPC conception of
social harmony.”).
7
See e.g., SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF EVERYTHING (AND WHY WE SHOULD
WORRY) 32 (2011); Jyh-An Lee, Ching-Yi-Liu, & Weiping Li, Searching for Internet Freedom in China: A
Case Study on Google’s China Experience, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 405, 426–27 (2013) [hereinafter
Jyh-An Lee et al.].
8
See, e.g., Jyh-An Lee et al., supra note 7, at 419–23, 426–28.
9
See infra notes 172–179 and accompanying text.
10
Jyh-An Lee et al., supra note 7, at 426–28.
11
Cf. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE
INTERNET 148–49 (2007) (indicating the difficulties in balancing free speech, privacy, and reputation in the
digital world); Jyh-An Lee, Regulating Blogging and Microblogging in China, 91 OR. L. REV. 609, 616–19

4
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alone in opposing blanket digital anonymity. Policymakers in developed and
developing countries alike have explored or implemented real-name
registration rules for online activities.12 Major Internet companies, including
Facebook and Google, have also advocated for real-name registration.
Interestingly, most scholarly work on online anonymity and relevant policy
issues thus far has not discussed real-name policies in depth. The aim of this
article is to bridge the gap between scholarly work on online anonymity and
real-name policies. By addressing the evolution of real-name registration
rules in China, this article illustrates the party-state’s gradual efforts to
eliminate cyberspace anonymity and etch Chinese characteristics on the
architecture of the Internet. This article also investigates relevant policy
concerns, such as privacy and free speech, within the Chinese context and
the effects of China’s real-name registration rules on the global Internet.
Part II illustrates the anonymity afforded by the Internet, the social value of
anonymity on the Internet, and the challenges online anonymity faces. Part
III details the evolution of the Chinese real-name registration policies and
rules and their underlying rationales. Part IV assesses the costs and
feasibility of the real-name registration policy in terms of privacy, free
speech, user behavior, and its enforcement by the government. In
conclusion, although the Chinese policy on real-name registration has raised
serious concerns associated with privacy and free speech and created
intricate enforcement problems, the international movement for real-name
registration and China’s role therein will profoundly affect the future of the
Internet.
II.

PROBLEMS POSED BY ANONYMITY AND THE INTERNET

The biggest impact of the real-name registration rules is that
individuals may no longer post writings and participate in discussions
without fear of reprisal in the physical world. While absolute anonymity
may not exist in digital environments, a limited degree of anonymity may
still be healthy for civil society. By thoroughly eliminating online
anonymity, real-name registration rules can fundamentally change the very
nature of the Internet and, in particular, can do away with the Internet’s
valuable contribution to civil society.

(2012) (discussing the Chinese approach to regulating online speech and privacy in the blogosphere)
[hereinafter Jyh-An Lee, Regulating Blogging and Microblogging in China].
12
See infra notes 63–64, 223 and accompanying text.
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Anonymity has been a longstanding, if incomplete, attribute of
cyberspace.13 The Internet has long been viewed as a privacy-friendly space
where mandatory user identification is the rare exception, not the rule. 14
However, such anonymity is by no means absolute. In today’s virtual world,
most people register information with third parties such as ISPs and domainname registries. 15 Online intermediaries occasionally hold identifiable
information. Most Internet users are actually only “traceably” anonymous.
Many Internet users share their identities with certain trusted parties while
remaining effectively anonymous to those outside that trusted circle. Put
differently, “[t]raceable anonymity is for the most part what currently exists
on the Internet” 16 although “[m]any people don’t realize that their
anonymous blogging or comments can be traced back to them.” 17 It is
therefore fair to say that very few individuals are actually untraceable in
cyberspace and neither anonymity nor pseudonyms guarantee true
untraceability.18
Under this architecture,
[T]he key is for the law to allow the unmasking of anonymous
people when they engage in harmful speech about others. But
people shouldn’t be unmasked too readily. The law thus must
draw a careful line between when it is appropriate to unmask
any anonymous speaker and when it isn’t.19
For this reason, “John Doe” lawsuits in the United States have become a
compromise between online anonymity and accountability. 20 Similarly,
China’s policy of real-name registration has to strike a balance when it is
necessary to unmask an anonymous speaker.

13
14

See, e.g., Bryan H. Choi, The Anonymous Internet, 72 MD. L. REV. 501, 503 (2013).
See. e.g., PAUL BERNAL, INTERNET PRIVACY RIGHTS: RIGHTS TO PROTECT AUTONOMY 237–38

(2014).
15
SOLOVE, supra note 11, at 147 (“[When] a user communicates over the Internet, her IP address is
logged. For any session of Internet use, the ISP typically has information that links a particular customer
with her IP address.”).
16
Id. at 146.
17
Id. at 147.
18
See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog & Frederick Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CAL. L.
REV. 1, 4 (2013). See also BERNAL, supra note 14, at 238 (claiming that untraceability is hard to achieve
and justify).
19
SOLOVE, supra note 11, at 147.
20
See, e.g., Chesa Boudin, Publius and the Petition: Doe v. Reed and the History of Anonymous
Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 2140 (2011).

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

6

VOL. 25 NO. 1

In the United States, the First Amendment’s freedom of speech
guarantee has long been extended to protect anonymous speech. However,
the scope of that constitutional protection has been the subject of much
debate.21 Consequently, as long as anonymity is expressive in its nature,
regulating online anonymity will have to overcome the problems of
constitutionality.22 Because the nature of the Internet makes it difficult to
trace online speakers, some legal scholars argue that anonymity is an
essential protection for dissidents 23 and indispensable for democratic
processes as it allows minorities, whistleblowers, and other marginalized
members of society to step forward and speak about matters of justice
without fear of repercussions.24 In addition, substantial research shows that
it is easier for people to freely express their views online rather than offline
because they believe identification is more difficult in the virtual world.25
As noted by Danielle Keats Citron, “anonymity can be essential for some
people to speak the truth about themselves and the world as they see it . . . .
Examples abound of the importance of anonymity for commentary on
politics, culture, and social matters.”26
Anonymity is particularly significant for democratic decision-making
processes insofar as it permits politically active individuals to express a
given viewpoint while avoiding any association with the viewpoint. In other
words, anonymity can be seen as a shield against the tyranny of the
majority. 27 Anonymity strengthens the expression of viewpoints while
concealing the identity of the person expressing his or her viewpoints.
Though U.S. courts have held that anonymous expression is protected under

21

See id.
See, e.g., Susanna Moore, The Challenge of Internet Anonymity: Protecting John Doe on the
Internet, 26 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 469 (2009); Jason M. Shepard & Genelle Belmas,
Anonymity, Disclosure and First Amendment Balancing in the Internet Era: Developments in Libel,
Copyright, and Election Speech, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 92 (2012).
23
See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Regulation of Computing and Information Technology: Flood
Control on the Information Ocean: Living with Anonymity, Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 J.L.
& COM. 395, 429 (1996).
24
See, e.g., Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous
Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 1574 (2007).
25
See, e.g., Shirley S. Ho & Douglas M. McLeod, Social-Psychological Influences on Opinion
Expression in Face-to-Face and Computer-Mediated Communication, 35 COMMUNICATION RESEARCH
190–207 (2008).
26
DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 60–61 (2014).
27
See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).
22
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free-speech principles,28 the issue is now focused on the proper standard for
a qualified right to online anonymity.29
As Professor Martin Redish notes,
[T]hough they are not identical, the right against compelled
speech possesses the same constitutional DNA as the right of
anonymity. Much as it has protected the right against
compelled speech, the Supreme Court has generally protected a
speaker’s right to keep his identity private . . . . [I]n certain
ways the First Amendment argument for anonymity is even
stronger than the rationale for a right not to speak. 30
To a government, anonymity poses obstacles to law enforcement.31 In
addition, it has long been argued that online anonymity can promote
irresponsible online comments and harmful behavior. 32 For example, by
defining anonymity as being unable to “trace the source of an electronic
message,” 33 Ann Wells Branscomb, a pioneer in the discourse on the
relationship between security and privacy, advocates a balance between a set
of rules governing online communications and responsible behaviors in
cyberspace. 34 She proposes that private parties may try to regulate
anonymity in electronic forums they control. 35 More recently, Ari Ezra
Waldman points out that not only is the image of a free and anonymous
online world wrong, but our online selves are also “traceable and
increasing[ly] identifiable as the extensions of our physical selves.” 36
Therefore, he proposes that we should reorient the way we think about our
online activities and rights, emphasizing privacy and free speech instead of
anonymity.37

28

See, e.g., id. at 342–43.
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace: What Can We Learn from John Doe?, 50 B.C.
L. REV. 1373, 1376–78 (2009).
30
MARTIN H. REDISH, THE ADVERSARY FIRST AMENDMENT: FREE EXPRESSION AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 160–61 (2013).
31
See, e.g., Choi, supra note 13, at 536–37.
32
See, e.g., id. at 539.
33
Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the First
Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1641 (1995).
34
Id. at 1641–45.
35
See Branscomb, supra note 33.
36
Ari Ezra Waldman, Durkeim’s Internet: Social and Political Theory in Online Society, 7 N.Y.U.
J.L. & LIBERTY 345, 348 (2013).
37
Id. at 386.
29
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Anonymous speech can benefit both speakers and audiences.
Recognizing potential benefits, Professor Redish persuasively notes that the
“rejection of a right of anonymity arguably undermines both speaker-centric
and listener-centric models of free expression.” 38 When “viewed in this
manner, the constitutional interest in protecting anonymity appears to be
even more powerful than the constitutional interest underlying the wellestablished right not to speak at all.” 39 In addition, anonymity is an
empowering tool with which speakers can level arguments against majority
opinions,40 making it possible for speakers to associate with a marginalized
segment of the population and thereby helping them self-realize without
worrying about tarnishing their personal image or reputation.41 Furthermore,
anonymous speakers can escape stereotyping based on ethnicity, race,
gender, or other personal characteristics. In this way, speakers ensure that
the audience will judge their arguments solely or largely upon its
anonymously delivered substance. In other words, anonymity “allows
people to be more experimental and eccentric without risking damage to
their reputation.”42
Moreover, since mandating the disclosure of identifying information
or registration of real names can directly or indirectly hamper expressions of
unpopular views, the purpose of protecting anonymous speech is to
empower individual speakers to counter illegitimate government practices.43
As A. Michael Froomkin points out, “the debate about anonymity . . . is in
effect a debate about the degree of political and economic freedom that will
be fostered, or tolerated, in a modern society.”44 Prohibiting the use of tools
or technologies that enable anonymity will exacerbate the fundamental
imbalance of power between individuals and their government.
For a number of reasons, anonymity can also benefit audiences.
Anonymity confers on audiences the ability to engage in relatively
38

REDISH, supra note 30, at 161 (emphasis in original).
Id.
See, e.g., Victoria Smith Ekstrand, Unmasking Jane and John Doe: Online Anonymity and the
First Amendment, 8 COMM. L. & POL’Y 405, 413 (2003).
41
See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–464 (1958).
42
SOLOVE, supra note 11, at 140 (citing Gary T. Marx, Identity and Anonymity: Some Conceptual
Distinctions and Issues for Research, in DOCUMENTING INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY 311, 316 (Jane Caplan &
John Torpey eds., 2001)).
43
See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Government Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996) (“[A]pplication of First Amendment law is best
understood and most readily explained as a kind of motive-hunting.”); see also Jed Rubenfeld, The First
Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767 (2001).
44
Froomkin, supra note 23, at 401–02.
39
40
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uninhibited information seeking, which can promote greater variety in the
marketplace of ideas by creating a swell in demand for otherwise seldom or
marginally sought-out material. 45 More importantly, anonymity can
promote the distribution of valuable speech and the ease with which
audiences can access such speech.46 Audiences also benefit from anonymity
insofar as it grants them more room to seek answers to potentially shameful
or embarrassing questions. 47 Finally, as with anonymous speakers,
anonymous audiences can escape or minimize the chilling effects that
stereotypes and stigmas have on an individual’s effort to seek out
information.48 In short, anonymity for audiences, as well as for speakers,
can benefit the whole of society.49
Despite all the benefits of anonymity, words can still cause harm50 and,
therefore, legal regulation of harmful speech is sometimes appropriate.51 It
is unreasonable to assert that unfettered anonymous speech is harmless.
Anonymous speakers are separated from any immediate consequences of
their speech, making them feel safe from retaliation despite having spread
defamatory or harassing speech. 52 In addition, from an information
acquisition standpoint, anonymous speech may be less valuable than
identifiable speech due to both the unverifiability of sources of anonymous
speech 53 and the audience’s difficulty in determining whether any selfinterest or bias lies behind a particular instance of anonymous speech.54 Put
differently, as the U.S. Supreme Court recognized, there is an inherent
tension between transparency and anonymity.55 Some prominent free speech
scholars have argued that most information providers in traditional

45
46
47
48
49
50

Choi, supra note 13, at 524–25.
See id. at 552.
Froomkin, supra note 23, at 408.
See Choi, supra note 13, at 524–25.
Froomkin, supra note 23, at 408–09.
See generally RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS THAT WOUND

(2004).
51

See, e.g., JON B. GOULD, SPEAK NO EVIL: THE TRIUMPH

OF

HATE SPEECH REGULATION 66–67

(2005).
52
See, e.g., Margot Kaminski, Real Masks and Real Name Policies: Applying Anti-Mask Case Law
to Anonymous Online Speech, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 815, 827–28 (2013).
53
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE
L.J. 855, 862–63 (2000).
54
Id.
55
See, e.g., Boudin, supra note 20, at 2172–73.
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information marketplaces have had to abstain from anonymous speech and
thus shoulder the responsibilities associated with transparency.56
While anonymity has tremendous intrinsic value, its harm lies in its
ability to cloak bad behavior. As Daniel Solove points out, “anonymity
allows people to escape accountability for their words, but this comes at a
cost—the loss of authorship credit under one’s real name.”57 Anonymity
also makes harassment and stalking easier than ever.58 However, the history
of free speech protection shows us that attempts to regulate against harmful
anonymity are often overbroad and eventually devolve into censorship of
perfectly legitimate expressions. The constitutional protection of free
speech requires “breathing space” for protected speech to flourish. Even
assuming speech sometimes gives rise to harmful consequences, blanket
identity-registration requirements will result in a chilling effect by deterring
anonymous speech and are consequently incompatible with the very idea of
free speech. 59 Therefore, asking whether the government can impose a
blanket ban on anonymity is a meaningful question that has become
increasingly significant as the proliferation of online dissenters and offline
revolutionaries has led governments around the world, particularly booming
Internet economies such as China, to adopt online real-name policies.60
REAL-NAME REGISTRATION POLICY IN CHINA

III.

Online real-name registration policies function to facilitate traceability
or prohibit anonymity 61 and have gained wide popularity in governments
from all corners of the globe. 62 For example, South Korea enacted realname laws in 2007, requiring all online users to verify their identities by
submitting their Resident Registration Numbers (RRNs) to ISPs. 63 In
56

See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, The Independent Significance of the Press Clause Under Existing Law,
35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955, 972 (2007).
57
SOLOVE, supra note 11, at 139.
58
See, e.g., Nathaniel Gleicher, Note, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal Standard,
118 YALE L.J. 320, 324 (2008).
59
See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 539 (1945); Watchtower Bible v. Village of Stratton,
536 U.S. 150, 165–66 (2002).
60
See, e.g., Eric S. Fish, Is Internet Censorship Compatible with Democracy?: Legal Restrictions of
Online Speech in South Korea, 10 ASIA-PAC. J. ON HUM. RTS. & L. 43, 47–50 (2009); John M. Leitner, To
Post or Not to Post: Korean Criminal Sanctions for Online Expression, 25 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L.J. 43,
53–55, 64–68 (2011)ġŜhereinafter Leitner, To Post or Not to Post].
61
See infra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
62
See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
63
See Timothy B. Lee, South Korea’s “Real Names” Debacle and the Virtues of Online Anonymity,
ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 15, 2011), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/08/what-south-korea-can-teachus-about-online-anonymity/.
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Germany in 2011, Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich advocated realname policies in the wake of the Norwegian mass shooting.64 Given online
anonymity’s implications for law enforcement and social order, it was
unsurprising when China decided in 2012 to expand its regulation of the
Internet, requiring microblog and other Internet services users to perform
real-name registration.65 This part provides a historic overview of China’s
local and national real-name registration rules, followed by the policy
rationales and criticisms of those rules.
A.

Evolution of the Chinese Real-Name Registration Policy

The Chinese government expressed its interest in establishing a realname registration Internet policy as early as 2003, when it ordered cyber
cafes to collect customers’ identification information. 66 The purported
policy goal of this real-name identification requirement was to fight crime
and to protect minors.67 Thereafter, the government conducted real-name
registration trial runs in a number of major Chinese cities, though not all of
them were successful.68 For instance, in 2006, the Beijing administration
failed to implement a real-name registration scheme for bloggers because of
strong protest from users, news media, and high-tech industries.69 Similar
frustration associated with local-government efforts to enact real-name
registration rules surfaced in Xia Men.70 In early 2009, the local legislature
in Hangzhou passed a real-name registration regulation, mandating that
users provide their true identities when posting information online or when
playing online games. 71 Nevertheless, the city government eventually
64

See id.
See infra notes 87–89.
66
See Jonathan Ansfield, China Web Sites Seeking Users’ Names, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/world/asia/06chinanet.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; see also Fan
Dong, supra note 4, at 409 (noting that the real-name system “has been gradually forced onto webmasters
and internet café visitors.”).
67
Henry L. Hu, Real Name Systems in Chinese Cyberspace: Authentication, Privacy and State
Capacity, 4 PEKING U. J. LEGAL STUD. 207, 215, 235 (2013) [hereinafter Hu, Real Name Systems].
68
See e.g., Fan Dong, supra note 4, at 409; King-wa Fu, Chung-hong Chan & M. Chau, Assessing
Censorship on Microblogs in China: Discriminatory Keywords Analysis and the Real-Name Registration
Policy, IEEE INTERNET COMPUTING, May–Jun. 2013, at 43 [hereinafter King-wa Fu et al.]; Leitner, To Post
or Not to Post, supra note 60, at 68–69. See also Trina K. Kissel, License to Blog: Internet Regulation in
the People’s Republic of China, 17 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 229, 252–53 (2007) (explaining how local
and provincial officials in China have also used their authority to require individuals using BBSs, chat
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decided against enforcing the regulation due to widespread objections. 72
Since then, the Chinese government has become more cautious in seeking
the private sector’s support for real-name registration.73
In August 2009, in order to comply with “secret” government orders,
several news portals, including Sina, NetEase, and Sohu, began to require
that new users provide their real names and identification numbers. 74 In
February 2012, in order to comply with a measure issued by the Beijing
Municipal Government,75 China’s four primary microblog companies—Sina,
Sohu, NetEase, and Tencent—set a March 16, 2012 deadline for users to
identify themselves by their real names.76 Currently, all microblog, or weibo,
users must register using their true identities, including their real names,
government-issued ID numbers (i.e., the national identification number),77
and mobile phone numbers. 78 Although microbloggers are able to use
nicknames or pseudonyms on their homepage, they cannot hide their real
names from either the microblog companies or the government. 79
Unregistered users, while still able to browse microblog posts, are not
allowed to post content.80 While Chinese bloggers no longer enjoy the same
level of anonymity that existed prior to the regulatory changes, the
government justified these changes as a means of tamping down on
antagonistic speech.81
The Chinese government has made the reduction of anonymity in
cyberspace a major policy goal, proposing and enacting a number of stricter
72

Id.
LAGERKVIST, AFTER THE INTERNET, supra note 69, at 56. See also Kay Hearn, The Management
of China’s Blogosphere Boke (Blog), 23 CONTINUUM: J. MEDIA & CULTURAL STUD. 887, 891 (2009)
(describing the fierce opposition to the compulsory real-name registration rules in China).
74
See, e.g., Ansfield, supra note 66.
75
See, e.g., Covington & Burling LLP, China Enacts New Data Privacy Legislation, E-ALERT:
GLOBAL PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY (Jan. 11, 2013), at 2, http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/83ff413aaf68-4675-850e-a0f54533d149/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/240e4b51-6450-4403-8cfeb0cea77c83
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76
See, e.g., BERNADETTE H. SCHELL, INTERNET CENSORSHIP: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 116 (2014).
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See, e.g., David Caragliano, Why China’s “Real Name” Internet Policy Doesn’t Work, THE
ATLANTIC (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/03/why-chinas-real-nameinternet-policy-doesnt-work/274373/; Reuters, China Considers Requiring Real Names, Government ID
Cards, to Sign Up for Internet Access, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 26, 2012, 9:08 AM), http://www.nydaily
news.com/news/world/china-require-real-internet-access-article-1.1227414; The Power of Microblogs:
Zombie Followers and Fake Re-tweets, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 17, 2012), http://www.economist.com/
node/21550333 [hereinafter The Power of Microblogs].
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79
See id.; The Power of Microblogs, supra note 77.
80
King-wa Fu et al., supra note 68, at 43.
81
See, e.g., Kevin Gregg, “Text ‘Revolution’ to Vote”: Social Media’s Effect on Popular Consent
and Legitimacy of New Regimes, 31 B.U. INT’L L.J. 315, 332 (2013).
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registration requirements. For example, in 2005, all universities and
colleges in China began to require users of Bulletin Board Systems (BBSs)82
to provide their real names.83 In 2007, the central government issued an
administrative notice ordering all online-game service providers to integrate
mandatory real-name registration in their products.84 According to China’s
Internet Society Chairwoman Hu Qiheng, the government’s goal is to
“achieve a state of ‘no anonymity’ in cyberspace.”85 Mr. Chen Wang, the
highest-ranking government official responsible for online information in
China, expressed a similar opinion that China needed to create a real-name
system that reduced or eliminated anonymity in cyberspace.86
As a consequence, in December 2012, lawmakers in the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress passed a new law entitled
Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on
Strengthening Online Information Protection (Online Information Decision),
mandating that “network service providers should require their users to
supply true identification information when signing [an] agreement to
provide them with website access, fixed line telephone, mobile phone access,
or allow them to post information via the network.” 87 The Online
Information Decision has two important legal implications. First, it elevates
China’s real-name policy to the level of national law.88 Second, it covers a
wide range of online services because most Internet enterprises provide
services for gaining “website access” and for “post[ing] information via the
82
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visited Oct. 25, 2015).
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Congress on Strengthening Online Information Protection] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Dec. 28, 2012, effective Dec. 28, 2012), art. 6, (China), http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/201212/28/content_2301231.htm [hereinafter Online Information Decision].
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See, e.g., Stephen Lawson, China Orders Internet Users to Disclose Their Real Names, PCWORLD
(Dec. 29, 2012), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2023521/china-orders-internet-users-to-disclose-theirreal-names.html; Joe McDonald, China Real-Name Registration Is Now Law in Country, HUFF POST (Dec.
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network.”89 Therefore, the real-name registration requirement has become a
legal obligation not only for providers of blogging services, but also for most
other online service providers in China. 90 The government has recently
expanded this requirement to users of instant messaging applications,
including WeChat, the most popular instant-messaging tool in China. 91
Moreover, in 2015, after several years of consideration, 92 the Ministry of
Industry and Information Technology finally implemented real-name
registration requirements.93 Mobile phone SIM card buyers now must have
their ID card examined by electronic ID readers.94 Those who fail to register
may run the risk of having their phone numbers suspended.95
On July 6, 2015, the National People’s Congress in China released a
draft of the “Cybersecurity Law” which includes more detailed rules
associated with online real-name registration.96 Article 20(1) of the draft is
identical to the network service providers’ obligation of collecting users’
identification information in the aforementioned Online Information

89

Online Information Decision, supra note 87, at art. 6.
See, e.g., Covington & Burling LLP, supra note 75, at 2 (pointing out that the real-name
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Decision. 97 Article 53 of the draft imposes legal liability for service
providers’ violations of the real-name registration obligation, including fines
ranging from RMB 50,000 to 500,000 and the suspension of business
licenses.98 Given past legislative behavior, it is very likely that the draft will
be passed into law with very few changes.99
B.

Policy Basis for China’s Real-Name Registration Rules

Why does the Chinese government so actively promote its real-name
registration policy? The official explanation is that real-name registration
rules can ensure a healthier and safer Internet and protect public interests
and social order from illegal content, such as libel, fraud, pornography,
rumors, and vulgarity. 100 The government’s strict control of the Internet
environment is based on the belief that online criticism and other harmful
language online may have destructive influences on society.101 For example,
baseless and hysterical rumors spreading on the Internet may be a serious
problem for a government that extensively plans and controls citizens’
activities.102 As such, by requiring real-name registration, the government
not only effectively regulates malicious and anonymous accusations,103 but
also maintains harmony in society—at least in theory.
Official
proclamations endorsing the real-name registration system are not novel in
China. As the Chinese Internet Society Industry Self-Discipline Committee
secretary-general Yang Junzuo recently stated, by reducing such personally

97

Wangluo Anquan Fa (Cao An) Quanwen ( 㖁 㔌 ᆹ  ˄ ⌅ ޘ㥹 Ṹ ˅  ޘ᮷ ) [PRC Draft of
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100
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note 88 (quoting the clarification made by Le Fei, deputy director of the Chinese legislature’s Legal Work
Committee, that the real-name registration regulation “is needed for the healthy development of the
Internet”).
101
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China’s real-name registration rules serve to “[prevent] vicious rumors about citizens and [to protect] the
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devastating attacks as fraud and libel, the real-name registration system can
eventually help to build a “harmonious Internet ecology.”104
The preamble of the Online Information Decision states that the
legislation is intended to “ensure Internet information security, safeguard the
lawful rights and interests of citizens, legal entities or other organizations,
and safeguard national security and public interests.”105 The function of the
real-name registration is to assist in the elimination of online malicious
speech, pornography, and “unfounded rumors.”106 It should be noted that
the Chinese government is not the only government to ascribe its real-name
registration policy to public interests and order in the digital world. The
South Korean government, which built the first national real-name
registration system, 107 similarly emphasized the desirability of a more
responsible and respectful culture for online expression.108 Therefore, it is
not surprising that the Chinese government has occasionally mimicked the
South Korean approach to justifying the official real-name registration
rules.109 Recently, some Chinese government officials again declared that
the real-name registration requirement is an important policy tool for
battling rising Internet crime.110 Other pro-government commentators even
claim that the requirement is one of several “efforts to combat terrorism,”
pornography, and violence.111
Critics claim that the real-name registration rules are a tool that the
Chinese government uses to prevent Internet users from criticizing
government officials or publicizing government corruption. 112 Without
online anonymity, a significant number of Chinese Internet users would
likely hesitate to criticize the government for fear of government
104
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retribution.113 Therefore, the real-name registration policy may have chilling
effects on speech, especially speech critical of public officials and other
sensitive topics.
IV.

EVALUATING THE CHINESE REAL-NAME REGISTRATION POLICY

China’s real-name registration policy may be critiqued from a variety
of different policy angles. Some critiques label the policy an infringement
on citizens’ fundamental rights.114 Others hold that the policy can neither
achieve its original goals nor benefit from effective enforcement.
Researchers have conducted studies exploring Chinese citizens’ perception
of the government’s attempts to develop a real-name registration policy but
the results of these studies vary significantly.115 According to a Shanghaibased survey conducted by Chinese scholar Zhao Yawen, a majority of
respondents were supportive or very supportive of the real-name registration
rules.116 A survey conducted by the semi-governmental organization China
Internet Network Information Center found similar results.117 By contrast,
surveys conducted on sites like Sina indicate that a majority of users
opposed the real-name registration policy.118 This part of the article will
analyze policy issues, ranging from privacy, free speech, and impact on
users’ behavior to effective enforcement of China’s real-name registration
policy.
A.

Privacy

Anonymity is a form of privacy protection that may facilitate privacy
violations. In other words, anonymity can preserve privacy by allowing
people to speak freely without having to submit to public identification.
Anonymity can also undermine privacy by allowing people to more easily
invade the privacy of others. More specifically, digital invasion of personal
privacy stemming from disclosure of non-public or potentially sensitive
personal information has been pervasive given that anonymous authors
enjoy the freedom to express themselves without fear of any negative
personal consequences.
As the tensions between anonymity and
113
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accountability and between privacy and free speech demonstrate, the choice
is not as simple as one between freedom and constraint. Rather, it is “a
choice that involves freedom on both sides.”119
For law enforcement, anonymity is a tool with which criminals evade
the public’s detection of their illegal activities. This aspect of anonymity is
an obstacle to law enforcement and compels governments around the world
to consider whether they should regulate anonymity-promoting technology
or even whether they should try to stamp out anonymity altogether.120 It is
not difficult to imagine that the more untraceable the various forms of online
speech become, the stronger the state’s interest in policing this speech
becomes.
Efforts to banish anonymity from the digital world promotes
surveillance121 and chills protected speech, raising the question of whether
governments’ blanket ban on online and offline anonymity will become a
reality. This question deserves considerable attention. Although the realname registration policy described above is designed to enhance accuracy in
online information, it may cause unintended—or intended—social costs.
Among other costs, a decline in privacy is a central concern surrounding
efforts to implement China’s real-name registration scheme. 122 The
implementation of real-name registration rules results in online platforms’
need to acquire users’ real names and other personal data, in turn raising the
risk of privacy infringement.123
Moreover, the private sector in China has long contended that without
reliable technology for privacy protection, sound implementation of a
rigorous real-name registration policy is impossible. 124 South Korea’s
experience may best exemplify how real-name registration rules can harm
privacy. South Korean Internet users were required to enter identifying
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information into the relevant websites for access. 125 However, due to a
severe security breach in which hackers stole the identification numbers of
thirty-five million Internet users, South Korea abandoned its real-name
registration policy in 2011.126 In the Constitutional Court of Korea, justices
heard complaints that South Korea’s Real Name Verification System had
unnecessarily exposed South Korean Internet users to Internet fraud.127 The
Court eventually ruled that the real-name registration rule was
unconstitutional in part because it posed an unnecessary risk to users’
personal data.128
Although privacy protection in South Korea may differ from that in
China, China has experienced a rapid increase in identity theft.129 Therefore,
its real-name registration policy may trigger privacy concerns as serious as
those witnessed in South Korea. Moreover, many defenders of the frequent
argument that online anonymity is a form of privacy protection130 argue that
China’s real-name registration rule might “erode online privacy”131 or even
“necessarily intrude on people’s privacy.”132 As China has enacted a series
of privacy laws133 and strengthened its privacy protection in recent years,134
privacy risks caused by real-name registration rules will no doubt become a
difficult legal issue in the near future.
B.

Free Speech

Commentators have claimed that real-name registration regulations
harm free speech. 135 It is easy to understand that in a repressive or
authoritarian society, anonymity enables dissidents to express anti-
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establishment views without fear of retaliation.136 It is equally important to
allow anonymity in a democracy as anonymity—again, by diminishing the
threat of retaliation—can persuade whistleblowers to come forward.137
According to Professor Redish, the U.S. Supreme Court has suggested
that:
[A] prohibition on anonymity almost inevitably chills
unpopular or controversial expression . . . . [A] choice against
allowing anonymity—unlike the choice not to permit silence
under certain circumstances—may well reduce the sum total of
information and opinion contributed to public debate . . . . In
cases where a speaker seeks anonymity, the speaker is
necessarily seeking to communicate, albeit anonymously.138
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a tradition of anonymous
pamphleteering 139 and it has “construed the First Amendment right of
anonymity to apply beyond the directly expressive context.”140
A chill on speech is a central concern raised by opponents of realname registration policies.141 If a government effectively enforces such a
policy, targeted monitoring may prevent users from expressing ideas
beneficial to society. 142 This stifles not only online creativity, but also
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political speech.143 Researchers have observed that some recent prospective
microbloggers have given up completing the website registration process.144
Preliminary empirical research suggests that, in China, the number of
politically sensitive microblog posts significantly declined after the
government’s enforcement of real-name registration. 145 Moreover, the
Chinese government has used its censorship mechanisms in tandem with
real-name registration to block speech by notable dissidents, such as Ai
Weiwei.146 Nonetheless, the long-term effect of the real-name registration
policy remains unclear.
Acknowledging these types of considerations, the Constitutional
Court of Korea ruled that the country’s real-name registration rule was
unconstitutional primarily because its benefits were not sufficient to justify
its significant restrictions on citizens’ right to free speech.147 Such reasoning
may provide valuable insights into the Chinese context.
As free speech is protected by the Chinese Constitution 148 and is
essential to online activities, Chinese citizens have begun to recognize its
value. 149 Although the Chinese government has been criticized for
suppressing free speech, the Chinese courts have begun to consider various
policy factors in relation to free speech cases. 150 Therefore, the free speech
implications of China’s real-name registration rules merit considerable
attention.
143
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Balancing the above considerations, the effective elimination of
online anonymity in China sacrifices constitutional free speech protections
for exaggerated concerns.151 Consequently, real-name registration rules can
delay the public’s emerging awareness of free speech in China. If a
government firmly values the right to anonymity, any move to adopt these
policies should proceed with the utmost caution.
C.

Impact on Users’ Behavior

If real-name registration rules restrict both political speech and
creativity, can these rules restrain libel, rumor, and other hostile speech?
The justification of real-name registration rules is relevant to whether
authorities can effectively enforce the law to protect citizens from
defamation, cyberbullying, and the like. In countries without similar
nationwide policies (e.g., the United States), governments appear to be
capable of detecting anonymous troublemakers in cyberspace. 152 This is
why Internet law scholars have long argued that “[all] of the good that
comes from monitoring could be achieved while protecting privacy.” 153
Clearly, real-name registration policies are not the only approach for holding
Internet users accountable for their online actions. What it takes to achieve
some type of monitoring, without resort to real-name registration, could be
merely certain built-in mechanisms capable of ensuring traceability.
Accordingly, the primary justification for real-name registration loses much
of its persuasiveness because less intrusive means of tracing online users
exist.154
According to empirical studies conducted in South Korea, real-name
registration rules did not change user behavior. Online defamation was as
common prior to the enforcement of those rules as it was after their
abolishment and the rules did little to improve the online reputations of
victims.155 The Constitutional Court of Korea confirmed the fact that the
government’s real-name registration requirement also failed to decrease
illegal online content.156 The South Korean example and others like it may
have important implications for China. If real-name registration rules
neither significantly change user behavior associated with hostile speech nor
151
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meaningfully strengthen protections for private reputations, their
justifications would obviously be inadequate. The same argument can be
applied in China as well. Recent microblogging activities in China suggest
that online activism has not decreased significantly since the Chinese
government established its real-name registration rules in 2012.157 Therefore,
it is doubtful whether the rules can achieve the original policy goals by
substantially shaping Internet users’ behavior.
D.

Enforcement

Enforcement is an important issue for the Chinese real-name
registration policy because government monitoring of individual Internet
users promises to be extremely costly and difficult.158 In this section, we
will analyze the difficulties and challenges faced by the Chinese government
in enforcing an effective real-name registration scheme.
1.

Level of Enforcement

There are numerous reports that neither the Chinese government nor
ISPs have strictly enforced real-name registration requirements. The
Chinese media has reported that Chinese microblog users who have not
verified their identities can still post messages online.159 Indeed, Internet
companies, including Sina, have admitted that they still let users post
information on their websites without real-name registration. 160 This
revelation implies that neither the government nor ISPs have strictly
enforced the real-name registration policy. On the one hand, ineffective
enforcement is likely inevitable because successful implementation of any
identity verification mechanism on such a large scale, involving so many
users, will necessarily take a long time.161 However, another explanation is
possible: to avoid a steep decrease in microblog traffic, the Chinese

157
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government may be hesitant to immediately enforce its own real-name
registration rules.162
The Chinese government must take into account the consequences of
strictly enforcing its own policy. A government shutdown of non-compliant
blogging platforms could trigger large-scale protests from Chinese Internet
users and garner widespread, unwanted attention from the international
community. Recently, the Chinese government has ultimately decided to
abandon strict Internet regulations due to extensive public discontent.163 For
example, in 2009 the Chinese government attempted to stipulate that all
computers made and sold in China be preinstalled with the content filtering
software Green Dam Youth Escort.164 This project was abandoned because
of strong opposition from the local Internet community, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, and the European-American Business Council.165 Furthermore,
some local governments’ initiatives in implementing real-name registration
rules also failed as a result of public objections.166 Therefore, if a platform is
shut down over noncompliance and triggers mass complaints from China’s
online community, the effective enforcement of the policy may ironically
run counter to China’s original policy goal: to build an ideal online
environment characterized by public order and trust.

162
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Online service providers are important intermediaries in the efforts by
the Chinese government to enforce its own Internet regulations.167 In order
to extract profit from the world’s largest and fastest-growing Internet
economy,168 most Internet companies in China have considerable incentive
to cooperate with the government in enforcing its regulations. 169 This
scenario reflects how the party-state controls the online world via the NAM.
As numerous Internet companies are highly profitable in China,170 the NAM
seems quite suitable for regulating the Internet in China. However, this
regulatory approach has not been working as planned since providers began
to hesitate to comply.171 The section below will discuss the main obstacles
to Internet companies’ cooperation with the government in implementing the
real-name registration rules, which include the high costs of cooperation,
services provided by foreign websites, and the lack of an effective
verification mechanism.
i.

High Cost of Cooperation

From the service provider’s perspective, the costs of implementing the
real-name registration policy are enormous. These costs stem not only from
the heavy burden of “identification verification,” but also from the huge
information security costs associated with protecting personal information
from theft. 172 It is unsurprising that Sina has resisted the real-name
registration rules from the very beginning.173 The company reported in its
2012 regulatory filing that it had yet to implement the scheme because of
“existing user behavior, the nature of the microblogging product, and the
lack of clarity on specific implementation procedures.”174 Other microblog
167
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operators are facing similar difficulties. 175 Likewise, primary mobile
operators, including China Telecom, China Unicom, and China Mobile, have
all expressed difficulty in implementing the registration policy because of
their large user bases. 176 Commentators indicate that the real-name
registration policy has been unsuccessful mainly because ISPs have been
reluctant to invest in the implementation of the registration.177
China’s past failure with enforcing real-name registration of cyber
café customers helps to explain why the high costs borne by private
companies would eventually hinder cooperation with the government. 178
Private companies that require real-name registration may be disincentivized
to cooperate with the policy if they find that the requirement costs them
significant numbers of customers.179 Without the assistance of ISPs or other
Internet companies, successful implementation of the real-name registration
policy may be impossible. Concerning the insurmountable costs faced by
Internet companies, avoiding misaligned incentives has become one of the
Chinese government’s main challenges in executing its current registration
rules.
ii.

Circumventing Foreign Websites

It is always challenging for national governments to regulate content
or online activities hosted by foreign websites because the digital
environment is borderless.180 The limited regulatory reach of nation states
creates impediments for the implementation of real-name registration rules
as well. South Korea is one of the few countries that adopted a real-name
registration policy before China, but it abandoned its efforts partly over the
difficulty of enforcement.181 To make matters worse for the South Korean
(reporting that Sina’s system is “full of loopholes offering abundant possibilities to disregard or
compromise using false identities”).
175
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venture, some international companies, such as YouTube, have decided to
refrain from full compliance with the policy and, in fact, redirected local
users to their international websites to circumvent the national registration
rules.182
Conversely, although some commentators argue that the Chinese realname registration policy may lead Internet users to foreign providers,183 the
circumvention issue is not a major problem for China because the country
has successfully built the world’s most sophisticated Internet filtering system,
the so-called Great Firewall, to block foreign websites.184 In the long run,
Internet companies serving Chinese users cannot dodge the Great Firewall
and redirect users to foreign websites. 185 In other words, the Internet
filtering techniques constitute a shield with which the Chinese government
can ensure the effective enforcement of the real-name registration policy. A
quick observation of the Chinese market for social media will lend further
credence to the viewpoint that the South Korean circumvention problem is
highly unlikely to occur in China. As the Chinese government blocks or
filters most popular social media websites (including Facebook, YouTube,
and Twitter), 186 Chinese Internet users generally rely on the services of
domestic Internet companies.187 Most of these domestic companies operate
only in the Chinese market and are accustomed to collaborating with the
authoritarian government in order to turn a profit. 188 Domestic Internet
companies, such as Tencent, have declared that they will support the real-

182
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name registration policy and have urged their users to respect the law.189 As
political correctness is the key to operating a successful Internet business in
China, domestic Internet companies can ill afford to offend the party-state
by redirecting users to websites abroad. Although redirecting users to
foreign websites may not be a serious problem for implementing the policy
in China, other factors, such as the high costs of cooperation and the absence
of an effective verification mechanism, may still prevent Internet companies
from implementing such a policy.
3.

Effective Verification

From a practical perspective, implementing this policy takes
considerable resources. Policymakers and government authorities need to
design a mechanism for verification of real-name registrations.190 Otherwise,
the rules will, in digital environments, prove to be hollow pronouncements
backed by idle threats. South Korea’s experience exemplifies how a
verification mechanism works: the government required that private portals
direct their users to a public website, where they would certify their identity
by entering their national identification numbers into the website. 191 By
contrast, the Chinese government has neither established a concrete
implementation plan nor designated an organization to play the role of
enforcer.192 Furthermore, China does not have reliable technology capable
of effectively executing online identity verification. In fact, a few years ago,
China attempted to develop a system allowing local police to register and
authenticate the real names of Internet café customers. 193 However, this
system proved to be ineffective because the overall surveillance program
failed to gain the necessary cooperation of cyber cafés. 194 Though the
Chinese government is noted for its stringent, technologically adept
regulation of online activities,195 it has not yet developed technology capable
of carrying out the real-name registration policy.
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In the case of China, online marketplaces have responded to the rules
in a way unintended by the Chinese government. Savvy Internet users are
perhaps easily circumventing current registration mechanisms in China and
elsewhere.196 Enterprising underground businesses have been selling fake
verification information to purchasers who wish to remain anonymous while
logging into microblog accounts.197 If a microblogger is willing to shell out
extra money to an illegal underground business, the blogger can
inconspicuously register with a microblog website. In China, some Internet
users have used so-called “ID Card Generator” software to generate ID card
numbers for Internet users who do not want to disclose their identities.198 In
light of this reality, enforcement of the registration policy is far from
satisfactory. If the market for fake identity increases to a critical mass and
the government truly commits itself to successfully enforcing the real-name
registration policy, authorities must either devote more and better resources
to enforcement of the policy or enact a new policy altogether. Otherwise, it
is very likely that the current, ineffectually enforced policy will remain only
a nominal threat to most Chinese Internet users.
V.

THE FUTURE OF DIGITAL ANONYMITY AND THE INTERNET

With recent advancements in digital technologies and the law, legal
scholars have recognized that the right to anonymity should not be
absolute.199 The network itself is traceable, user identity cannot be hidden
perfectly, 200 and real-name registration policies are not the only strategy for
controlling online activities. The Constitutional Court of Korea has rightly
pointed out that less restrictive policies for controlling online activity are
available.201 Therefore, the argument that real-name registration policies are
uniquely suited to the task of policing the Internet is quite doubtful. One
scholar argued that a user’s “identity [can] be requested where needed and
appropriate . . . .”202 Under this approach, the main issue would be whether
requiring an Internet user’s identity information is necessary and appropriate.
Given the aforementioned concerns, real-name registration may not be an
196
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ideal approach in the digital sphere; even scholars advocating for a reduction
in online anonymity find that such extensive real-name registration rules are
an unacceptable approach to Internet regulation.203
Professor Lawrence Lessig, arguably one of the most important
commentators on Internet law, once proposed that “we should certainly
architect cyberspace to ensure anonymity.” 204 Nonetheless, China’s realname registration policy is pushing the Internet in a direction opposed by
Lessig: the elimination of online anonymity. 205 This endeavor may
profoundly reshape the architecture and norms of the Internet in China and
around the world.206 After all, China has become a major worldwide cyber
power 207 and there is no justifiable reason to conclude that the country’s
real-name registration policy is incapable of influencing the global Internet.
Although China has failed to implement its registration rules in the
short term, these rules may have important policy implications for global
Internet governance. The Chinese government’s NAM has leveraged private
commercial power and corporate resources to regulate the Internet208 and, in
doing so, regulated the Internet in a more effective and economical way.209
It is possible that the Chinese government may collaborate with key players
in the Internet industry to further advance the real-name registration policy.
Some Internet companies may realize that adhering to the policy will
eventually work toward their own corporate benefit.
Though laws in some countries, such as Germany, protect anonymous
or pseudonymous use of Internet services,210 a number of major social media
companies, such as Google, Facebook, and LinkedIn, have expressed
interest in urging users to register with real names.211 Google has announced
203
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that it retains the right to disable accounts whose users are not using their
real names 212 whereas Facebook has already deactivated some accounts
registered under pseudonyms or fake names.213 While Google recently lifted
its real-name requirement for Google+ users,214 Facebook’s explanation for
its real-name policy is that this policy can prevent users from “act[ing]
abusively towards other members of [the] community . . . .”215 Those major
Internet companies’ recent preference for real-name registration 216 only
strengthens the argument that real-name registration has the potential to
become the norm in the global Internet environment.
Google and Facebook have also been developing effective real-name
verification technologies,217 which the Chinese government lacks. Google
and Facebook are, of course, key Internet platforms. Thus, both their
enthusiastic development of real-name registration architecture218 and their
extraordinary influence on Internet governance 219 will perhaps shape the
global Internet environment in ways that favor China’s implementation of an
effective real-name registration policy. The more incentives there are for
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Internet companies to adopt real-name registration, the more likely China
will be able to put such a policy into action.
If such endeavors are justified under public policy rationales, such as
building a more civil Internet220 or combating terrorism,221 then China may
be set to shape a very different Internet architecture. Moreover, the Chinese
approach to eliminating digital anonymity by implementing effective realname registration rules may have a strong “spill over” effect on global
Internet governance and regulations.222 China is not alone in promoting such
policies. Other countries, including Iran, Kazakhstan, Syria, and Saudi
Arabia, have enacted laws eliminating user anonymity in the online world.223
Some individuals and enterprises also believe that the Internet would be
more civil if Internet users were identifiable online by their real names.224
For example, Hans-Peter Friedrich, Interior Minister of Germany, is of the
opinion that the identities of bloggers should be transparent so that the
bloggers can be held accountable for their posts.225 Politicians in the United
Kingdom and Ireland have made similar proposals.226 From a comparative
perspective, a real-name registration requirement may also be designed as a
safe harbor for ISPs to avoid potential liability, rather than a strict legal
obligation with Chinese characteristics.227
It is true that limiting anonymity might be an effective strategy to
combat abusive online behavior. But should Internet gatekeepers be legally
obliged to require real names? Although some commentators argue that the
benefits of anonymity are often outweighed by its costs to civility,228 one can
just as reasonably argue that:
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[W]ithout anonymity, domestic violence and sexual assault
victims might not join online survivors’ groups for fear that
their abusers might discover them. LGBT teenagers might not
seek advice from online support groups about coping with
bullying if they had to worry about their peers learning of their
sexual orientation . . . . With inflexible real-name policies,
society may lose a lot and gain too little.229
The ongoing development of various real-name registration policies
suggests that a strong “spill over” effect on our online lives is unavoidable.
One should not overlook the conventional constitutional wisdom that
anonymous speech, including the use of pseudonyms, is a powerful tool of
political debate.230 As such, this constitutional tradition merits an extension
to encompass the Internet, the most powerful communication tool for the
marketplace of information and ideas to date invented by human beings.
Although commentators appear to agree that online anonymity is not
absolute, we argue here that real-name registration policies should never
serve as the main approach to controlling the Internet. Even American
scholars promoting the application of civil-rights law to online harassment
cases have argued that “real name policies are not guaranteed to deter bad
actors. Determined harassers may be able to figure out a way to disguise
their identity. Private platforms should retain online anonymity as the
default rule.”231
VI.

CONCLUSION

Online anonymity poses new challenges for regulators and raises new
complex legal dilemmas that elude quick and easy solutions under existing
law. China’s real-name registration policy represents a significant response
to this challenge and also exemplifies—with strong Chinese
characteristics—the NAM. This policy has raised serious concerns
associated with privacy and free speech. Moreover, the Chinese government
has encountered intractable enforcement problems arising from a
pronounced misalignment of incentives for ISPs and a lack of reliable
technology for real-name verification. Nonetheless, it is still too early to
229

CITRON, supra note 26, at 28.
See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 358–59, 363–67 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); George F. du Pont, The Criminalization of True Anonymity in Cyberspace, 7 MICH.
TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 191 (2001); Miguel E. Larios, ePublius: Anonymous Speech Rights Online, 37
RUTGERS L. REC. 36 (2010).
231
CITRON, supra note 26, at 28.
230

34

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 25 NO. 1

assert that the policy is doomed to fail. In fact, support for this type of
policy has progressively expanded to other countries and the global Internet
industry. Regardless of how the laws, norms, and Internet architecture of
anonymity evolve and interact with each other in the global digital sphere,
the international movement for real-name registration and the role of China
therein will profoundly affect the future of the Internet.
The findings and insights in this article strongly suggest that societies
should establish a more balanced regulatory architecture including various
real-name registration policies enforced both by governments and by
Internet companies. Legal solutions to the problems of online incivility and
illegality should take shape sooner rather than later and should protect online
victims without threatening free-speech rights and privacy rights enjoyed by
Internet users. Ideally, the new legal solutions would not expand the
existing categories of unprotected speech by turning protected speech into
unprotected speech. At the same time, the question as to how Internet
intermediaries, such as ISPs, will play their role in the changing digital
landscape needs to be answered very carefully so as not to encroach upon
the fundamental privacy rights of Internet users. Any redesign of regulatory
architecture that functions solely to meet the requirements of real-name
registration policies can significantly reshape online norms in ways that
strengthen authoritarian governance of the Internet. Therefore, while the
public and private sectors work together implementing real-name
registration policies, we must be wary of a more authoritarian governance of
the Internet becoming the default of our online lives. This governance can
easily lack transparency and accountability and condemn certain kinds of
positive online behaviors. Our approach should work to balance these
considerations.

